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ABSTRACT 
 
We use the real wage–profit rate schedule to examine the direction of technical change in 
India’s organized manufacturing sector during 1980–2007. We find that technical change 
was Marx biased (i.e., declining capital productivity with increasing labor productivity) 
through the 1980s and 1990s; and Hicks neutral (increasing both capital and labor 
productivity) post-2000. The historical experience suggests that Hicks-neutral technical 
change may only be a passing phase before we see a return to the long-term trend of 
Marx-biased technical change. We also find that the real profit rate has increased from 
about 30 percent to a very high 45 percent, that the real wage rate increased marginally, 
and that the share of capital in value added doubled. Overall, technical change in India’s 
organized manufacturing sector during 1980–2007 favored capital.  
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In this paper we study the direction (i.e., bias) of technical progress in India’s organized 
manufacturing sector during 1980–2007. A country’s rate of economic growth ultimately 
depends on the growth of its productive population, its stock of accumulated capital 
goods, and on technical progress.  
The direction of technical change can be studied within the framework of the 
neoclassical model by assuming that there exists a well-behaved aggregate production 
function that summarizes the possibilities of substitution of capital for labor in a sector or 
economy (see Ferguson [1968]). While this is the standard approach and it has merits, it 
is not exempt of problems, in particular those raised during the Cambridge debates 
(Cohen and Harcourt 2003) and those concerning the proper aggregation conditions 
(Felipe and Fisher 2003 and 2006). The Cambridge debates delved into the idea that 
“capital,” as used in aggregate production function studies, is simply the market value of 
a huge range of different “physical capital goods.” However, as the wage rate changes, 
the prices of all these goods can undergo any pattern of change, depending on the exact 
structure of their costs of production. This means that there is no guarantee that a lower 
wager rate will lead to a lower value of capital per worker or more employment, for a 
given stock of the capital value, as the neoclassical analysis predicts.
1 
The aggregation problem refers to the conditions under which microeconomic 
production functions can be aggregated to yield a neoclassical aggregate production 
function. The results of this body of work unequivocally lead to the conclusion that the 
conditions are so stringent that, for all practical purposes, one can think that aggregate 
production functions do not exist. A brief summary of the aggregation conditions is as 
follows (Felipe and Fisher 2003 and 2006): (i) except under constant returns, aggregate 
production functions are unlikely to exist at all; (ii) even under constant returns, the 
                                                 
1 There are two extremely damaging problems: (i) reswitching: It refers to the violation of the supposedly 
inverse relation between capital intensity and the profit rate. It leads to the possibility of a non-negative 
relationship between the profit rate and the capital-labor ratio; (ii) reverse capital deepening: It occurs 
when the value of capital moves in the same associated direction as the rate of profit. In this case, the most 
profitable project is the one with a less capital-intensive technique.  2
conditions for aggregation are so very stringent as to make the existence of aggregate 
production functions in real economies a non-event.  This is true not only for the 
existence of an aggregate capital stock, but also for the existence of such constructs as 
aggregate labor or even aggregate output; (iii) one cannot escape the force of these results 
by arguing that aggregate production functions are only approximations. While over 
some restricted range of the data approximations may appear to fit, good approximations 
to the true underlying technical relations require close approximation to the stringent 
aggregation conditions, and this is not a sensible thing to suppose. 
Instead, we use the real wage–profit rate schedule (Sraffa 1960), a flexible tool 
consistent with neoclassical and non-neoclassical models. The real wage–profit rate 
schedule allows us to analyze technical change through changes in the productivity 
parameters, labor and capital productivity, and in the factor rewards (real) wage and 
profit rates. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we derive the real 
wage–profit rate schedule and discuss the different types of technical change. In section 3 
we show India’s wage–profit rate schedule at different points in time and study technical 
progress in India’s organized manufacturing sector. Section 4 offers some conclusions. 
 
2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK: THE WAGE–PROFIT RATE 
SCHEDULE 
 
We start with the income accounting identity that states that total (net) value added (Yn) 
equals the sum of total nominal wage bill/total compensation of employees (Wn), plus 
total profits/operating surplus (Πn).
2 This identity can be written as follows: 
 
nn nnn YW w L r K ≡+ ∏ ≡ +       ( 1 )  
 
                                                 
2 This holds at any level of aggregation—national, sector, industry, or firm. It does not involve any 
assumption about the production structure or the nature of markets.  3
Total labor compensation (Wn) can be expressed as the product of the nominal 
wage rate (wn) times the number of workers (L). Similarly, profits can be written as ex-
post nominal profit rate (rn) times the constant price value of the stock of capital (K). In 
real terms, equation 1 becomes: 
 
rr rrr YW w L r K ≡+ ∏ ≡ +        ( 2 )  
 
where Wr (wr ) is the real wage bill (real wage rate) and is obtained by dividing the 
nominal wage bill (nominal wage rate) by the consumer price index (Wr=Wn/Pw, 
wr=wn/Pw); Πr (rr) is the real operating surplus (real profit rate) and is equal to the 
nominal operating surplus (nominal profit rate) divided by an appropriate price index  
(Πr=Πn/Ps, rr=rn/Ps). For the purposes of this paper we take real value added (Yr) as the 
sum of the real wage bill and real operating surplus.
3 
 Expressed as per worker, equation (2) can be written as:  
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where y=Y/L is labor productivity and k=K/L is the capital-labor ratio. Using θ=Y/K (i.e., 
capital productivity), equation 3 can be written as:  
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3 Alternatively, one can have a common deflator for value added, total wage bill, and operating surplus.  4
Equation (5) is known as the real wage–profit rate schedule (Foley and Michl 1999). The 
real wage–profit rate schedule shows that, given labor and capital productivity, there is a 
trade-off between real wage rates and real profit rates. This schedule allows us to analyze 
the direction of technical change.  
In the real wage rate and real profit rate (w,r) space, if the real profit rate is equal 
to zero, the real wage rate equals labor productivity. Similarly, if the real wage rate 
equals zero, the real profit rate is equal to capital productivity. The slope of the real 
wage–profit rate schedule is the negative of the ratio of labor productivity to capital 
productivity,  wr y k // θ ∂ ∂ =− =− , that is, the capital-labor ratio. A change in the slope 
of the real wage–profit rate schedule or a shift in the schedule is an indicator of the 
direction of technical change.  
Technical change can be decomposed into a combination of labor-saving and 
capital-using (or saving). Technical change is labor-saving if y
∧
>0 (i.e., if labor 




< 0) (i.e., capital 
productivity increases (decreases)). Accordingly, technical change can be classified into 
one of the following four categories: 
 





=0 (the real wage–profit rate schedule becomes 
steeper, the vertical intercept shifts outwards, and horizontal intercept remains 
unchanged). 
ii.  Hicks-neutral technical change: equally labor- and capital-saving—y θ
∧∧
= (the 
slope of the real–wage profit rate schedule remains unchanged, and both vertical 
and horizontal intercepts shift outwards). 





>0 (the real wage–profit rate schedule becomes flatter, the 
vertical intercept is unchanged, and the horizontal intercept moves inwards).  5





(the real wage–profit rate schedule becomes steeper, the vertical intercept shifts 
outwards, and the horizontal intercept shifts inwards). 
 
3. TECHNICAL CHANGE IN INDIA’S ORGANIZED MANUFACTURING 
SECTOR 
 
Using data for India’s organized manufacturing sector during the period 1980–2007, we 
examine the bias of technical change. The definition of the variables used in our analysis 




















Table 1: Data Definition and Sources 
Variable Definition 
Nominal output/value added  (Yn)  Net value added. This is arrived at by subtracting total input 
costs and depreciation from the value of total output.  
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 
Total number of workers  (L)  Total number of employees (includes production workers 
employed directly or through contractors and all other 
employees). Source: ASI 
Nominal labor compensation/total wage bill (Wn)  This is defined as the sum of wages and salaries, 
employers’ contribution (such as the provident fund and 
other funds), and workmen and staff welfare expenses.  
Source: ASI 
Consumer price index (Pw)  Consumer price index for industrial workers (index series 
for different base years, spliced and rebased to 1993–94).  
Source: Reserve Bank of India 
Nominal wage rate (wn)  Nominal labor compensation divided by total number of 
workers (wn=Wn/L) 
Real wage rate (wr)  Nominal wage rate deflated by Pw (wr=wn/Pw) 
Nominal operating surplus/profits (Πn)  Value added net of total labor compensation (Πn=Yn-Wn) 
Deflator for capital stock and operating surplus (Ps)  Wholesale price index for machinery and equipment (1993–
94=100).  
Source: Reserve Bank of India  
Real capital stock (K)  Book value of fixed capital, deflated by Ps (K=Fixed 
Capital/Ps). Fixed capital stock is obtained from ASI and is 
defined as the depreciated value of fixed assets owned by 
the factory as on the closing day of the accounting year. 
Fixed assets are those that have a normal productive life of 
more than one year. Fixed capital includes land, including 
lease-hold land, buildings, plant and machinery, furniture 
and fixtures, transport equipment, water system and 
roadways, and other fixed assets such as hospitals, schools, 
etc. used for the benefit of the factory personnel. 
Nominal ex-post profit rate (rn)  Nominal operating surplus divided by real capital stock 
(rn=Πn/K) 
Real operating surplus (Πr)  Nominal operating surplus deflated by Ps (Πr =Πn/Ps) 
Real ex-post profit rate (rr)  Nominal ex-post profit rate deflated by Ps (rr=rn/Ps) 
Real value added (Yr)  Compute as the sum of real wages and real operating 
surplus (Yr=Wn/Pw+Πn/Ps) 
Price deflator for value added (P)  Implicit price deflator backed out from the computed real 
value added and nominal value added (P=Yn/Yr) 
Labor productivity (y)  Real value added divided by total number of workers 
(y=Yr/L) 
Share of the real wage-bill (labor compensation) in 
real output (value added)/labor share (
l




rr sw L Y =  
Capital productivity (θ)  Real value added divided by real capital stock (θ =Yr/K) 
Share of capital in real output (value added)/capital 
share (
k
r s ) 
( ) ( )
k
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The real wage–profit rate schedules of India’s organized manufacturing sector for 
the years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2007 are shown in figure 1. The figure 
shows the trade-off between real wage and profit rates. Between 1980 and 2000, the 
horizontal intercept of the real wage–profit rate schedule shifted inwards, i.e., capital 
productivity fell (θ
∧
< 0). At the same time, the vertical intercept of the real wage–profit 
rate shifted upwards i.e., labor productivity increased (y
∧
>0). In other words, the 
technical change was capital-using and labor-saving (i.e., it was a Marx-biased). 
However, after 2000, both the vertical and horizontal intercepts shifted outwards (i.e., 
both labor and capital productivity increased). Though they did not increase by the same 
proportion, technical change after 2000 is Hicks-neutral. 
 


































As shown above, the slope of the real wage–profit rate schedule, 
wr y k // θ ∂ ∂ =− =− , gives the direction of technical change. This indicates that the 
direction of technical change is the result of a combination of changes in labor 
productivity (y), capital productivity (θ), and in the capital-labor ratio (k). Figure 2 shows 
the three variables: y, k, and θ. We know that between 1980 and 2000, labor productivity 
increased, while capital productivity declined (Marx-biased technical change). This 
means that the increase in labor productivity was entirely the result of an increasing 
capital labor-ratio. After 2000, both capital productivity and the capital-labor ratio 
increased, and therefore both contributed to the increase in labor productivity. Post-1999, 
the capital-labor ratio has remained almost constant, with both labor and capital 
productivity increasing. This is reflected in figure 1 in a near-parallel outward shift in the 


























































































































































It is useful to compare the type of technical change of India’s organized 
manufacturing sector with that of other countries. Many researchers (see, for example, 
Foley and Michl [1999] and Marquetti [2003]) have documented that capital productivity 
falls and labor productivity rises (i.e., an increasing capital-labor ratio) across both 
developed and developing economies. The empirical evidence provided by Marquetti 
(2003) shows that Marx-biased technical change in the form of declining capital 
productivity and increasing labor productivity seems to be the unavoidable development 
path. Marquetti (2003) further noted that while the long-term pattern of technical change 
in industrialized societies is Marx-biased, it is interrupted by periods in which both labor 
productivity and capital productivity increase (i.e., technical change during this period is 
Hicks-neutral).   10
With the caveat that the pattern of technical change shown by Marquetti (2003) is 
for the whole economy and for a long period, the nature of technical change in the Indian 
manufacturing sector over the period 1980–2007 seems to conform to the international 
norm.
4 If this is indeed the general pattern, the worldwide experience would suggest that 
Hicks-neutral technical change is a temporary phase that is part of a long trend of Marx-
biased technical change. 
The long-term pattern of technical change, as shown in an increasing labor 
productivity and a falling capital productivity, can be explained using two alternative 
hypotheses.  The first is based on the neoclassical growth model, which explains this 
pattern as the result of a stable production function, the movements along which can 
explain the inverse relationship between capital and labor productivity. The second is the 
classical-Marxian view, which argues that these changes reflect a bias in the technical 
change, which, in turn, is caused by the incentive structure inherent in a capitalist 
economy, driven by profitability. 
    According to the classical view, profit rates, through their impact on investment 
and capital accumulation, play a crucial role in determining the growth rate of an 
economy. In order to earn higher profit rates, firms try to introduce technical changes that 
lower production costs at the existing level of real wages, and that lead to high profits. 
These technical changes are in turn brought about by increasing capital accumulation. 
However, once the technical innovation becomes widespread, prices are driven down and 
profit rates fall. Capital accumulation and the need to innovate, which comes with the 
drive to increase profit rates, therefore ultimately cause a fall in the profit rate.  Note that 
the rate of profit could be falling even if the share of profits (or operating surplus) in total 
value added increased. This would happen if capital productivity fell. To see this consider 
the following relationship: 
 
                                                 
4 For the total economy for the period 1978–2000, Felipe, Laviña, and Fan (2008) find that both labor 
productivity and capital productivity are increasing, but not in the same proportion, and technical change is 













r s is the share of real operating surplus in real value added (i.e., the capital share). 
We decompose the profit rate as shown in equation (6) for India’s organized 
manufacturing sector. This is shown in figure 3. We see that the share of profits in real 
value added increased over the period 1980–2007, while capital productivity (shown 
earlier) declined, except during the post-2000 period. The real profit rate remained stable 
between 1980 and the mid-1990s at close to 30%; it declined afterwards and increased 
again after 2001 to about a very high 45%.  This makes India’s organized manufacturing 
a very profitable sector. 
 






























































































































While the profit rate of India’s organized manufacturing sector has increased, the 
real wage rate has barely increased and was outpaced by the gains in labor productivity 
(figure 4). Commensurate with an increase in the share of profits in value added is the 
decline in the labor share (i.e., the real wage bill as a share of real value added); see 
Felipe and Kumar (2010) for a further discussion of a declining labor share in India’s 
organized manufacturing sector.   
 

















































































































































































































Using the real wage–profit rate schedule, we have examined the direction of technical 
change in India’s organized manufacturing sector during 1980–2007. We have found that 
technical change was of a Marx-biased nature until 2000, and Hicks-neutral afterwards.  13
This implies that labor productivity increased and capital productivity declined during 
1980s and 1990s, while both labor and capital productivity increased post-2000. The 
historical experience, however, suggests that Hicks-neutral technical change may only be 
a passing phase before we see a return to the long-term trend of Marx-biased technical 
change.  
 The puzzling aspect of India’s pattern of technical change is that it has not 
entered yet a phase of steady decline of the profit rate, as seems to be the historical 
experience of many other countries. Indeed, in most countries, rapid capital accumulation 
has led to a steady decline in the profit rate. This is not the case of India’s manufacturing 
sector, where the profit rate is about 45%, significantly higher than in 1980. On the other 
hand, the real wage rate has only increased marginally during this the period analyzed, 
and the distribution of income has clearly tiled toward capital, whose share doubled 
during 1980–2007.  The conclusion of our analysis is that technical change in India’s 
organized manufacturing sector during 1980–2007 has favored capital.   14
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